INTRODUCTION
The purchase and sale of energy assets is generally a complex, expensive and risky transaction.
Transactions often involve real and personal property, transfer potential liabilities that can have enormous financial and reputational impacts for both the vendor and purchaser, and are often required to be closed within tight deadlines. When disputes relating to transactions arise, they often involve difficult legal issues that can complicate the successful recovery of losses. In the current economic environment, as deal flow increases as industry participants refresh their business strategies in Canada, now is the perfect time to take stock of some of the legal issues involved in litigating purchase and sale agreements ("PSAs") of energy assets. 
This paper identifies issues that commonly impact disputes relating to

I. INTERPRETING THE PSA
PSAs in the energy context are generally drafted, negotiated and executed by sophisticated commercial entities, often with assistance of both external and internal legal counsel. PSAs are usually in writing and are comprehensive in outlining the rights and obligations of the contracting parties. Further, the industry has attempted to standardize simple transactions through the development of the Canadian Association of Petroleum Landmen Property Transfer Procedure (the "CAPL PTP"). 2 However, notwithstanding the careful attention paid at the drafting stage of agreements, unpacking the meaning of a PSA before a court can involve piecing together a puzzle of complicated facts, legal principles and evidentiary rules.
Courts will generally try to hold parties to their bargains and will assume that parties are aware of the legal consequences of the terms agreed to. The purpose of contractual interpretation is to "ascertain the objective intent of the parties. is a standard form document that can be used for simple transactions. The CAPL PTP contains a number of elections that parties can make to modify the terms of a transaction and expressly contemplates inclusion of a "Head Agreement" laying out specific negotiated terms relevant to the particular deal at hand. 3 See for example Guarantee Co of North America v Gordon Capital Corp, [1999] 3 SCR 423, [1999] SCJ No 60 where the Supreme Court of Canada, at para 46, noted a "general reluctance to disturb the choice of terms by sophisticated commercial parties" and stated at para 45 that a sophisticated party "can be expected to know the meaning of fundamental legal terms […] and it is appropriate to give effect to their intent as expressed in the plain words of the contract". In the oil and gas context see for example, NOV Enerflow ULC v Enerflow Industries Inc, 2015 ABQB 759, [2015] AJ No 1343 at para 14 [NOV Enerflow]. 4 An exhaustive overview of the principles of contractual interpretation is beyond the scope of this paper. This Part provides specific commentary on how contractual interpretation impacts the litigation of disputes relating to PSAs in energy disputes. what a reasonable person would have objectively understood from the words of the agreement in the factual matrix in which the agreement was made. 6 Courts determine objective intent by looking at the actual words the parties have negotiated, having regard to the surrounding context. The words used must be given their "ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of formation of the contract."
7 It is not just what the parties knew at the time, but also "what the parties using those words against the relevant background would reasonably have been understood to mean." 8 This opens up a broad range of factors that can inform a court's analysis into objective intent.
A. Analyzing the Words
The starting place for a court's analysis of a contract is an assessment of the ordinary and grammatical meaning of the written words. However, the ordinary and technical usage of a particular word is not necessarily determinative of a word's meaning because " [t] he meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of the document is what the parties using those words against the relevant background would reasonably have been understood to mean." 9 Courts will adopt the meaning of words that parties have defined themselves in agreements; 10 however the words of the contract, and the entire contract itself, must be read in context.
11
6 IFP Technologies, supra note 5 at para 79, citing Geoff R Hall, Canadian Contractual Interpretation Law, 2nd ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2012) at 33; see also Sattva, supra note 5 at para 59. 7 Sattva, supra note 5 at para 47. 8 Sattva, supra note 5 at para 48 citing Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society (1997), [1998] 1 All ER 98 (UK HL) at 115 [Investors] . 9 Sattva, supra note 5 at para 48 citing Investors, supra note 8. 10 NOV Enerflow, supra note 3 at para 17. 11 IFP Technologies, supra note 5 at para 83, citing Sattva, supra note 5 at para 85.
Further, even where the literal meaning of words is apparent, they will not be relied upon where to do so would "bring about an unrealistic result or a result which would not be contemplated in the commercial atmosphere" in which the contract was entered into. 12 However, while commercial common sense can be a factor in interpretation, it cannot supersede the actual language used in a contract.
13
PSAs often involve very comprehensive defined terms. Where such definitions exist, courts will adopt that meaning in their analysis, even if the express definition conflicts with the ordinary or technical usage of the word. 14 As lawyers are often involved in drafting PSAs, an assessment of commercial reasonableness is more limited given that it is presumed parties intended the natural legal consequences of the language used. 15 There are a number of cases where the courts have interpreted words commonly used in energy-related PSAs, some examples of which include:
"working interest"; 16 "wells producing to a Facility"; 17 "Assets" (which included an analysis of related terms including "Tangibles", "Miscellaneous Interests" and "Petroleum and Natural Gas where the Court stated "the contra proferentum rule should not be invoked where there are sophisticated parties, represented by lawyers and each had a meaningful opportunity to participate in the negotiation of the instrument": at para 48, citing Ironside v Smith, 1998 ABCA 366, 223 AR 379 at paras 66-67. PSAs also can expressly exclude the operation of the contra proferentum rule, see for example the CAPL PTP, supra note 2 at clause 1.14. 16 In IFP Technologies, supra note 5 at para 98 the Court stated that "working interest" is a "legal term of art" in the oil and gas context, holding that it "constitutes the percentage of ownership that an owner has to explore, drill and produce minerals from the lands in question". 17 The the Court was tasked with considering the meaning of the words "ordinary course of business" as part of a review regarding the allocation of Gas Cost Allowance Credits. The Court stated at para 51 that "it is unwise to attempt to give a comprehensive definition of the term but rather that it is best to consider the circumstances of each case". See also NOV Enerflow, supra note 3 where the Court stated at para 32 "Whether something is or is not done in the ordinary course of business is a contextual, fact-specific determination to be made on a case-by-case basis in light of all circumstances known to the parties at the time". 20 In NOV Enerflow, supra note 3, "Indemnified Losses" was expressly defined in the agreement. The decision provides that while "the parties' definitions may stretch the conventional understanding of indemnified losses, their deliberate decision to capitalize and define that term" was sufficient evidence of their intention: at para 20. the Court outlined the following principles for satisfying "best efforts": 1. "Best efforts" imposes a higher obligation than a "reasonable effort"; 2. "Best efforts" means taking, in good faith, all reasonable steps to achieve the objective, carrying the process to its logical conclusion and leaving no stone unturned; 3. "Best efforts" includes doing everything known to be usual, necessary and proper for ensuring the success of the endeavor; 4. The meaning of "best efforts" is, however, not boundless. It must be approached in the light of the particular contract, the parties to it and the contract's overall purpose as reflected in its language; 5. While "best efforts" of the defendant must be subject to such overriding obligations as honesty and fair dealing, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted in bad faith; 6. Evidence of "inevitable failure" is relevant to the issue of causation of damage but not to the issue of liability. The onus to show that failure was inevitable regardless of whether the defendant made "best efforts" rests on the defendant; 7. Evidence that the defendant, had it acted diligently, could have satisfied the "best efforts" test, is relevant evidence that the defendant did not use its best efforts ( However, there are limitations on the use of such evidence as part of establishing the factual matrix and the application of the corresponding legal principles can be difficult in practice. As outlined in greater detail below, there is no bright line as to what evidence properly forms part of the factual matrix, and there is ample room in the law for litigants to argue as to the admission and weight of particular evidence where it helps their case. In practice, attempts to completely exclude potential factual matrix evidence at trial are often ill-founded and time wasting. Courts are uniquely equipped to allow evidence to be entered at trial and then deal with its admissibility on weight in rendering the decision. 30 Further, breach of contract cases often involve alternate pleadings that a contract is ambiguous or should be rectified, both of which arguably allow a wider scope of evidence to be admitted -courts are able to sort through the evidence and decide which evidence can be used for which purposes.
Fact Witnesses
The most general limitation on the scope of the factual matrix is that the evidence of the factual matrix must go to the objective and not subjective intent of the parties. 31 
Evidence of Negotiations
Another limitation to the admissibility of evidence relevant to the transactional context is the general rule that evidence of the negotiation of specific provisions does not form part of the factual matrix. 37 
II. PRE-CLOSING DISPUTES
The transfer of the risk and title to assets (referred to as the "Closing") does not usually occur on the date a PSA is signed. Instead, PSAs prescribe a set date for the closing of a transaction to take place after signing (the "Closing Date"). The period between signing and the Closing Date is referred to in this paper as the "Interim Period".
Facility" in the CO&O Agreement should be read as "wells associated with the Facility" on the basis of the language in the Annotations to the Model Agreement is backwards: the language of the Annotations does not prevail over the language of the contract": para 33. In the Interim Period, the vendor and the purchaser have conditions to satisfy and covenants to perform (or negative covenants not to undertake) before Closing can occur. 55 The Interim Period often gives rise to uncertainty and litigation because of unforeseen events, or because one party proposes to structure the transaction in a particular way and that structure has effects on strangers to the transaction. These issues can derail or force renegotiation of the transaction and, if litigation ensues, things often move quickly and decisions taken in the heat of the moment can affect the closing of the transaction.
Below, we review several types of issues that can arise in the Interim Period, including disputes over the duties owing between the parties that must be met to finalize a transaction (in particular the duty of honest performance), disputes relating to the satisfaction of contractual obligations in the Interim Period (including issues relating to the occurrence of a material adverse change) and disputes regarding the exercising of preferential rights.
A. The Duty of Honest Performance
In In this case the Court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the defendant had failed to disclose a lawsuit relating to the assets that were sold. The Ontario Superior Court held that the agreement itself contained no positive obligation to disclose the information and that there was no evidence of actual dishonesty or fraud. 64 CAPL PTP, supra note 2, clause 13.04A. 65 As noted above, contracting parties cannot contract out of the duty to act honestly.
Therefore, during the Interim Period, if the purchaser makes an inquiry relating to the assets being sold and is provided with false information in response by the vendor, or the vendor dishonestly withholds information that a purchaser may need to make its assessment, there may be a possible claim in damages based on the duty of honest performance, even if there is no express breach of the representations set out in the PSA. 66 However, Canadian courts have generally not been sympathetic to parties that fail to do proper due diligence and have held that evidence of dishonesty or fraud is required to support a claim. 67 Therefore, vendors should be mindful of the potential liability associated with the duty of honest performance, and purchasers need to be careful in their due diligence to protect their interests. Parties can mitigate this risk somewhat by ensuring that a strict communication protocol is observed during the Interim Period.
B. Failure to Satisfy Obligations During the Interim Period
Breach
PSAs often include certain obligations that must be satisfied by the parties during the Interim In that case the defendant alleged that the plaintiff breached a duty of good faith owing to it by being aware and "wilfully blind" of errors during the due diligence period and interim period and failed to identify those errors to the defendant prior to closing (see para 22). While the decision pre-dates Bhasin, supra note 56 and the Ontario Court of Appeal found there had been no breach of the duty of good faith) it is included as an example of a fact pattern where such an issue has arisen. Further, given the change in the law due to Bhasin, supra note 56, the result may have been different if the decision was heard at a later date. 67 For example in Empire, supra note 63 the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had failed to disclose a lawsuit relating to the assets that were sold. The Ontario Superior Court noted that it was the plaintiff's obligation to conduct due diligence to satisfy itself on the issue and that the agreement itself contained no positive obligation to disclose the information and that there was no evidence of actual dishonesty or fraud. See also Macera v Abcon Media Canada Inc, [2017] OJ No 3740, 2017 CanLII 45939 (ON SCSM) where the Ontario Superior Court rejected a claim on the duty of honest performance relating to a transaction, expressly noting that the plaintiff had opportunity to conduct its own due diligence and failed and that there was no evidence of dishonesty on the part of the defendant.
of the PSA. Where there has been a "fundamental breach" of a contract 68 the innocent party has two options: it may elect to treat the contract as terminated or it may elect to affirm the contract by waiving the other party's obligation to perform and sue for damages as a result of the breach.
69
If a breach is not "fundamental" it is treated as an ordinary breach of contract entitling the innocent party to sue for damages.
Failure to Satisfy Condition
PSAs in the energy context will often expressly set out the contractual terms that must be met in order for Closing to occur and the remedies available to the parties as a result of any failure to satisfy those obligations. For example, the CAPL PTP sets out express conditions precedent 70 that must be satisfied for Closing to occur and the remedies available to the parties if a condition precedent has not been satisfied. 71 If non-compliance is discovered prior to Closing, the CAPL 68 A fundamental breach of a contract occurs where the failure of one of the contracting parties to perform a primary obligation under the contract has the effect of depriving the other party of substantially the whole benefit which the parties intended that party to receive: here a condition is inserted in an agreement for the benefit of one party, that party cannot take advantage of the condition unless it satisfies the court that it took all reasonable steps or used its best efforts to fulfill the condition. The law implies a duty on the part of the person for whose benefit the condition was inserted to take such steps": 3081169 Nova Scotia Ltd v Lunar Fishing (New Brunswick) Inc, 2010 NSSC 147, 290 NSR (2d) 260 at para 57. 70 Note that at common law only a breach of a "true conditions precedent" will prevent the formation of a contract. A "true condition precedent" is one where "[t]he obligations under the contract, on both sides, depend upon a future uncertain event, the happening of which depends entirely on the will of a third party": Turney v Zhilka, [1959] SCR 578, 18 DLR (2d) 447 at 583-584. If a contract does not expressly set out that a breach of a condition entitles the innocent party to treat the PSA as terminated, a breach of a condition will not entitle a party to such relief at common law unless the condition precedent is also a fundamental term. 
Frustration
Where it becomes impossible to perform obligations as a result of factors outside of either party's control, a party can also resort to reliance on the doctrine of frustration to avoid obligations under a contract. 76 In order to succeed in arguing that the contract has been frustrated, a party must been discharged. Clause 10.03 sets out conditions for the benefit of the vendor which include that payments have been tendered to the purchaser and that conveyance documents have been delivered. 72 demonstrate that, due to a supervening event that fundamentally changes the obligations to be performed, it has become impossible to perform the contract. 77 A change in legislation has also been held in the energy context to amount to frustration in certain circumstances. In Stetson, the defendant investment bank wished to rely on a "material adverse change-out clause" set forth in an engagement letter for a bought deal financing that was not ultimately reduced to a formal underwriting agreement. 81 The bank refused to close on the financing, in part because between the time of the engagement letter and three weeks later, commodity prices had begun to free-fall. 82 The Court found that the bank had improperly refused to close, and held it liable for damages in the amount of the difference between the amount of the failed financing, and a subsequently entered financing at half the price: $16 Million. 83 The case illustrates the risk of refusing to close -if a purchaser does claim that a MAC has occurred and refuses to close, and is wrong, significant damages can result.
A current example of a situation where parties may be looking for a MAC arose when the AER made changes to the LMR program. 84 With no notice to industry, the AER required license transferees to have a significantly greater LMR before licenses would be transferred. 85 Anecdotally we understand this change caused transaction parties to consider whether this would constitute a MAC under their PSAs, though we are aware of no reported decisions to that effect.
C. ROFRs
The requirement to issue ROFRs pursuant to agreements relating to a transaction is a frequent cases to identify litigation strategies or issues that are beneficial to parties in navigating these types of disputes.
A ROFR is "a commitment by the grantor to give the grantee the first chance to purchase should the grantor decide to sell." 87 Typically, a vendor will agree to sell an interest in a jointly held asset to a purchaser, and any co-owner of that asset may have the first right to acquire the interest on the same terms as agreed with the purchaser. 88 In a sale of a package of assets, the purchaser will usually provide the value it allocates in good faith to the assets subject to the ROFR to the vendor, and will indemnify the vendor against any damages it suffers from the third party disputing the ROFR value. 89 The vendor and the purchaser will require that, before Closing occurs, the third party either exercises its right to acquire the asset, or waives or is deemed to waive its right to acquire the asset. Court of Appeal stated "a right of first refusal is an important contractual right, one purpose of which is 'to prevent a party from being forced into an undesired partnership': para 28. 89 In contrast to what we believe to be industry practice, CAPL PTP, supra note 2, clause 7.01B provides that the values are to be "in good faith and on a reasonable basis", and requires the parties to "consult with respect to the value as appropriate". This seems to require that the parties actually agree to the ROFR values. It also provides that any disputes about the value between the parties are to be arbitrated, which, given the fact that this arbitration would have to occur before ROFR notices were sent out, seems unlikely to be undertaken. entitled to a ROFR and the vendor and the purchaser claim that a ROFR does not apply either because of an exception or because of the specific language of the contract. These cases exemplify several key issues relating to litigation process and strategy.
Blaze Energy Ltd v Imperial Oil Resources
Blaze 95 provides a good example of some of the procedural and strategic issues that can impact the outcome of ROFR-related litigation. It involved ROFRs relating to two separate but related transactions. For both transactions, Blaze Energy Ltd. ("Blaze") claimed it was entitled to ROFRs and that it had not been properly provided with ROFR notices.
Blaze and Imperial Oil Resources ("IOR") were parties to two agreements covering certain lands (the "Lands") and facilities: a 1960 operating agreement covering certain lands (the "Lands Agreement"); and a 1988 Construction, Ownership and Operating Agreement (the "CO&O") governing a gas plant (the "Plant" Whitecap in turn agreed to dispose the Lands and the Plant to Keyera Partnership ("Keyera").
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The ROFR provisions applicable to both transactions were contained in the Lands Agreement and the CO&O. The Lands Agreement contained a 10-day ROFR. 98 The CO&O contained a 30-day ROFR, with the following exception:
Any Owner may, without restriction, dispose of an interest in the Plant in conjunction with the disposal of the Owner's corresponding working interest in the lands in the West Pembina Area from which Gas is being produced into the Plant.
99
IOR issued a ROFR notice to Blaze with respect to the Lands, pursuant to the Lands Agreement (the "IOR ROFR Notice"), and concurrently advised Blaze and the other owners of the Plant that it was not issuing a ROFR Notice for the Plant. 100 IOR's position was that no ROFR notice was required for the Plant because the proposed disposition fit within the CO&O exception set out above, as the disposition was in conjunction with a lands disposition. This case is instructive because of how the litigation proceeded. The parties agreed by consent to limit the evidence to affidavits from principals in order to proceed with an expedited trial. One wonders if further evidence of the factual matrix and the commercial context of the CO&O being entered would have had an impact on the outcome, which might have been available in a full trial.
When the CO&O was entered into, the Plant likely existed to serve the Lands -they were constructed by owners of mineral rights that needed to process their gas. It stands to reason, therefore, that if a sale of the Lands was being undertaken, the mineral owners would assume that a corresponding interest in the Plant would also be sold, as the Plant existed only to serve the Lands. However, if a Plant owner wished to sell its Plant interest without a corresponding interest in the Lands, the other Plant owners (also being owners of the Lands producing the throughput)
would be entitled to acquire that interest to ensure that the owners of the Lands maintained control of the Plant. At the time of entry into the CO&O, the Plant owners likely did not conceive that a proposed purchaser of the Lands would proceed with a purchase of the Plant without completing a purchase of the Lands -but this is what Whitecap plainly proposed to do. Therefore, quaere whether expert or other factual matrix evidence demonstrating that, in 1988, industry practice would generally be that owners of mineral lands wanted to build and own facilities and did not want non-mineral owners to have a piece of facilities, would have had an impact on the interpretation.
Further, the remedy sought by Blaze was limited to the three questions it posed to the Court. It may have had alternate remedies it could have pursued, including seeking injunctive relief to prevent the sale, suing for damages to recover losses suffered as a result of the sale, or to seek specific performance to try to unwind the sale after Closing. However, an injunction would have required an undertaking as to damages (which Blaze may or may not have been able to provide).
The Court stated that Blaze should have brought any application to assert an entitlement to exercise the ROFR during the ROFR notice period (consistent with the Chase decision that the notice period "expiry operates like a limitation"). 112 A pragmatic ROFR holder should commence a claim prior to expiry of the ROFR notice period in order to ensure that there is no possibility of it losing its right to enforce its ROFR.
Northrock Resources v ExxonMobil Canada Energy
Another ROFR decision that highlights the importance of litigation strategy is Northrock.
113
Northrock Resources ("Northrock") alleged that ExxonMobil Canada Energy ("ExxonMobil") had structured a transaction to intentionally deprive Northrock of a ROFR in an alleged breach of the duty of good faith. 114 ExxonMobil defended the claim on the basis that it had chosen to structure 112 Chase, supra note 91 at para 42. 113 Northrock, supra note 36. 114 This duty of good faith in the context of ROFRs was first set out in in GATX Corp v Hawker Siddeley Canada Inc (1996), 27 BLR (2d) 251, [1996] OJ No 1462 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)).
the transaction for tax reasons. ExxonMobil was painstaking in its record keeping and was able to
show that it had thought about the ROFR issues but that it had been prepared to proceed with the structure because of the enormous potential tax savings (amounting to roughly $29 million).
115
ExxonMobil relied on evidence that demonstrated it was aware that its actions would ultimately deprive Northrock of its ROFR and risk Northrock bringing legal action against it, but that reducing tax was the main driver for structuring the transaction. 116 The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that ExxonMobil's awareness of the impact to Northrock, and acceptance of the risk that Northrock might challenge the structure of the transaction was not evidence of a breach of the duty of good faith, noting that businesspeople take risks all the time and it was clear that reducing tax was the main reason for structuring the transaction this way.
117
This case is instructive because ExxonMobil knew that there was a good possibility that it would be sued by Northrock. The properties being disposed of were valuable and Northrock would have exercised in the circumstances -in fact, it was the runner-up in the auction preceding the sale.
Therefore, ExxonMobil diligently showed that the potential tax savings were the main reason for undertaking the structure; and disclosed general legal opinions obtained with respect to the structure to Northrock. 118 This had the effect of bolstering ExxonMobil's claim that it had nothing to hide, and it had taken absolutely every step to ensure that it could use the ROFR exception to accomplish its tax goal. It was accordingly very difficult for Northrock to argue that ExxonMobil had been acting in bad faith. This case is an example of how properly papering the purpose of a transaction structure can be vital in order to assert or defend a claim. 
III. POST-CLOSING DISPUTES
Generally speaking, all claims arising post-Closing will involve an interpretation of the PSA at issue, in accordance with the principles of contractual interpretation set out in Part I. One reason for this, pursuant to the doctrine of caveat emptor, is the common law presumption that, absent contractual protections providing otherwise, a purchaser of real property acquires it "as is." 
A. Disputes over the Subject-Matter of the Transaction
One area frequently litigated is the subject-matter of a purchase and sale transaction.
120
Determining the subject of a sale is complicated in energy transactions where real and personal property is often described through the use of land schedules or by "white map sales" (where companies choose to divest all of their interests in wells and facilities in a given area). Often years after Closing, disputes can arise as to whether or not a particular asset was included in the 119 There are several exceptions to the application of caveat emptor, including: (1) fraud; (2) a mutual mistake; (3) a contractual condition; or (4) a warranty collateral to the contract which survives closing. A detailed overview of these exceptions is beyond the scope of this paper. transaction, and more importantly, which party is responsible for any liabilities (in particular for abandonment and reclamation) associated with that asset.
121
One might think that the practice in the energy context of using broad definitions for terms such as "Petroleum and Natural Gas Rights", "Miscellaneous Interests" and "Tangibles" would create a catch-all to include any assets inadvertently excluded from express reference in the PSA.
However, in practice, such terms have sometimes been defined more narrowly. In Anadarko,
122
for example, notwithstanding the existence of a broad definition of "Tangibles" in the PSA at issue, the Court held that the "common sense view of the definition of Tangibles is something that exists and can be used in the exploitation of the petroleum and natural gas", and therefore concluded an abandoned battery did not fit within the broad definition. 123 The Court further found that the abandoned battery was not a "Miscellaneous Interest". That term was defined to include property, assets and rights "pertaining or ancillary to either the Petroleum and Natural Gas Rights or Tangibles" and, because the Petroleum and Natural Gas Rights and Tangibles were seen to have been "defined as having an operational purpose", the Court then concluded "it follows that the Miscellaneous Interests must also have such a purpose."
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The resolution of these types of disputes relies heavily on determining the proper interpretation of the defined terms in the PSA and in objectively determining what the parties reasonably understood they were buying and selling. The key determination for the court will be whether it is 121 Cases concerning asset sales and environmental liabilities include for example: clear from the definition of the "Assets" that a particular asset or liability was intended to be included as part of a sale.
In Talisman v Esprit, 125 the issue was whether Talisman Energy Inc. ("Talisman") purchased certain sulphur stockpiles from Esprit Exploration Ltd. ("Esprit"). The Court determined ownership of the sulphur stockpiles based whether, on a proper interpretation of the contract, the sulphur stockpiles were included in the definition of the "Assets" conveyed.
As per industry practice, "Assets" was defined in the PSA to include "the Petroleum and Natural
Gas Rights, the Miscellaneous Interests and the Tangibles..." 126 At issue was whether the sulphur stockpiles fit within the definitions of "Miscellaneous Interests" or "Tangibles". 127 The Court held that the sulphur stockpiles did not expressly fit within those definitions. The Court then considered whether the factual matrix evidenced an objective intent by the parties to include the sulphur stockpiles as part of the sale. This raised a number of interesting evidentiary issues.
One particularly contentious issue was whether a draft PSA that had been included as part of the data room was properly admissible as factual matrix evidence. In the draft PSA sulphur was explicitly included in the definition of "Miscellaneous Interests". The Court referred to the existence of the draft PSA as being the "Elephant in the Room", noting that if the language from the draft PSA had been included in the final, executed version of the PSA "there is little doubt in my mind that Talisman would now be the proud owner of the Disputed Interest". 128 The Court considered whether such evidence was properly admissible as part of the factual matrix. As explored further in Part I of this paper, generally drafts of agreements or the negotiation of specific provisions do not form part of the factual matrix. However, in this case, the Court held it was properly admissible context evidence.
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The Court relied on other evidence when considering the factual matrix, including fact evidence from a Talisman employee, a Letter of Intent executed by the parties which explicitly referenced sulphur being part of the sale, and an appraisal report prepared for Talisman which also referenced sulphur as part of the valuation of the assets. 130 Given the parties' familiarity with sales involving Sulphur and the fact that the executed agreement contained no reference to sulphur, the Court held there was sufficient evidence to conclude the parties did not objectively intend it to form part of the transaction.
In Nexxtep 131 , the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld a trial decision which considered a dispute relating to the extent of the sale of certain assets by Talisman to Nexxtep. The issue was whether the sale included the "Petroleum and Natural Gas Rights" associated with a specific producing zone for a particular vertical well. The PSA's land schedule included the rights "below the base of the Mannville" formation and at the time of the sale, the parties understood, and the Energy Resources Conservation Board had designated, that the vertical well was producing sweet gas from the zone above the Mannville formation and that sour gas was being produced through a horizontal well from the zone below. However, after the PSA closed it was determined by the regulation that this was an error and that in fact the vertical well was producing sweet gas, at least in part, from the zone below the base of the Mannville. 
B. Indemnity Disputes
Most PSAs will contain indemnities which allocate future risk between the parties. Often energyrelated PSAs contain multiple indemnities including a general indemnity, an abandonment and reclamation indemnity, and an indemnity specific to environmental claims. 135 The scope of indemnity coverage is determined on the basis of an ordinary contractual interpretation exercise.
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Clearly setting out the scope of the indemnity, the triggering event and the targeted losses specific to the transaction at issue is imperative to avoiding disputes.
There is no established definition of indemnity, but generally indemnity clauses in PSAs provide 132 Nexxtep, supra note 18 at para 29. 133 Nexxtep, supra note 18 at para 30. that one party protects the other from specified damages or losses that arise as a consequence of the ownership of the property. 137 Recovery under an indemnity differs from recovery for breach of contract. An indemnity does not necessarily require a breach of its terms or any other contractual terms to be triggered. Indemnity provisions "oust any common law cause of action, instead providing a contractually agreed-upon code, including rights and remedies, to make good the damage -the "claim" as contractually defined -caused by the breach." 138 The scope of an indemnity needs to be set out expressly. Parties can expand or limit the scope of liability that would ordinarily exist at common law through express language.
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Indemnities are strictly interpreted and are "untrammeled by any special rule." 140 Indemnities can be drafted in a number of ways, including using a fault-based structure (whereby one party agrees to indemnify the other for losses suffered by the other as a result of a breach of representation or warranty or other contractual term) or a no-fault-based structure (whereby one party agrees to indemnify the other on the occurrence of a certain type of loss).
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Indemnities will generally have a "triggering event" which stipulates when it will operate. Often indemnities are drafted so that the indemnity is only triggered when there has been a breach of a representation or warranty in the agreement. 142 An indemnity can also be triggered as of a set date Black's Law Dictionary defines an indemnity contract as one between "two parties whereby the one undertakes and agrees to indemnify the other against loss or damage arising from some contemplated act on the part of the indemnitor, or from some responsibility assumed by the indemnitee, or from the claim or demand of a third person, that is, to make good to him some pecuniary damage as he may suffer." Blacks Law Dictionary, 7 th ed, sub verdo "indemnity". (for example with the indemnity providing that liability will accrue for breaches occurring before or after a set date).
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In addition, the remoteness principles that apply to a breach of contract and the foreseeability of loss required to recover for a tort claim do not apply to an indemnity and damage that was not contemplated by the parties at the time an agreement was entered into may be recoverable under an indemnity depending on the wording of the indemnity. The term of an indemnity is also critical.
An overly broad indemnity could be interpreted such that the vendor has a liability that "goes on forever, except to the extent that it might be limited by statutory limitations." 144 In the paper "Environmental Risk Allocation in the Asset Rationalization Process" the authors stated:
In every case, broad indemnities of unlimited term are inappropriate for both the vendor and purchaser as they often conflict with the vendor's intentions as expressed in the representations and warranties and often provide the purchaser with a false sense of security, thereby inhibiting his due diligence efforts.
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PSA disputes often arise over whether a particular claimed loss is in fact covered by the indemnity. pertaining to the Assets or to any well located on the Lands, or any of them" and a separate indemnity specific to abandonment and reclamation which required the purchaser "to see to the timely performance of all abandonment and reclamation obligations pertaining to the Assets which in the absence of this agreement would be the responsibility of Vendor." 147 All of the indemnities tied coverage to the "Assets" or to matters or things "pertaining to" the Assets. As noted earlier, the Court found that the abandoned battery did not fit within the definition of "Assets". Therefore, the liabilities associated with it did not "pertain to the Assets" and the Court found that the claimed losses did not fit within the scope of the indemnity. This case illustrates how drafting the indemnity, particularly in relation to expressly defined terms, can operate to narrow the scope of an indemnity that otherwise uses very broad language.
Another issue that can arise in the interpretation of the scope of indemnities is whether the indemnity only covers damages incurred by third parties. While indemnities often only cover third party claims, 148 there is no general principle that indemnities only cover third party claims and a contractual interpretation exercise is required to determine whether the indemnity extends to losses suffered by an indemnitee directly. 149 If parties intend to limit the scope of an indemnity to third party claims, they must do so through clear and express language to that effect.
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C. Representations and Warranties
Often disputes occurring post-Closing relate to alleged breaches of representations and warranties in the PSA. The most litigated scenario is where a purchaser alleges that a vendor has made a false 147 Anadarko, supra note 18 at paras 41-42. 148 Weyerhaeuser, supra note 35 at para 208 (note this paragraph is part of the dissenting opinion of Laskin J representation and warranty in the PSA and claims damages as a result of the untrue representation and warranty. 151 While the terms "representation" and "warranty" are often used interchangeably or in conjunction with one another in oil and gas PSAs, there is some inconsistency in Canadian law as to whether representations and warranties should be treated as distinct legal concepts (with the difference being whether a representation imports tortious liability with damages for breach measured on the tort standard versus a warranty being a contractual breach with damages for breach measured on the contract law standard).
152
While a detailed review of this issue is outside the scope of this paper, one practical effect of this distinction is the question of whether a party is required to prove reliance on a representation and warranty in order to recover damages for a breach. Reliance is not a necessary element to prove a breach of contract -all that is required is for a term of a contract to be breached to entitle a party to seek damages. 153 However, reliance is a necessary element of a claim for misrepresentation in tort (as "a representee who knows the truth is not deceived" becomes whether that knowledge precludes it from successfully recovering damages for that breach.
Parties often attempt to address this issue expressly in a contract through use of sandbagging clauses. A pro-sandbagging clause stipulates that knowledge of the purchaser of any breach of a warranty or representation prior to Closing does not impact any right to indemnification or other remedy post-Closing. An anti-sandbagging clauses stipulates that the purchaser waives any right to claim for a breach of a representation or warranty if it had knowledge of the breach prior to Closing. 155 If reliance is not necessary to form the basis for a breach of a representation and warranty, then sandbagging clauses would seem unnecessary.
A review of cases considering breaches of representations and warranties demonstrates that the issue of reliance has been dealt with somewhat inconsistently. For example, in Eagle Resources 156 the Court of Appeal found that there was a breach of a representation and warranty which provided that there was no undisclosed fact materially adverse to any asset because the vendor had knowledge that the reserves information provided to the purchaser was inaccurate despite the fact that the purchaser had knowledge of the error. 157 The Alberta Court of Appeal stated "The argument of counsel for the respondent is that the purchaser knew the facts. But clause 3.3(g) does not speak of that. It warrants that all facts reports etc. are in the contract, not that the purchaser has been told about them." 
IV. LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY
If a party has a viable claim arising out of a PSA, there are still a number of issues that can impact the successful recovery of damages. This Part discusses two common limitations that often impact how a claim can be commenced or whether it can be commenced at all: 1) limitation periods that bar bringing claims in their entirety; and 2) the existence of limitation of liability or exclusion clauses that limit or preclude recovery of damages.
158 Eagle Resources, supra note 156 at para 17.
A. Limitation Periods Generally
Limitation periods can be a harsh limitation on the ability to recover damages. A mistake as to the applicable limitation period can result in a total bar to a claim. Two important issues regarding the operation of limitation periods in PSAs are the impact of survival periods for representations and warranties often found in energy PSAs and the special rules regarding limitation periods applicable to environmental contamination claims.
The Limitations Act provides that a claimant must seek a remedial order within two years from the date the claimant first knew or ought to have known, that the "injury" for which the claimant seeks a remedial order had occurred, was attributable to the defendant, and warranted bringing a proceeding. 159 "Knew, or ought to have known" imports the concept of "discoverability" which importantly does not require perfect knowledge or certainty. 160 However, determining the applicable limitation period is very fact specific and can be difficult to assess. 
B. Contractual Limitation Periods versus Statutory Limitation Periods
Most PSAs include a clause specifying the length of time that the representations and warranties survive after Closing, referred to as the "survival period". During the survival period, the parties can discover a breach and commence a claim. However, after the survival period, no claims for a breach of a representation or warranty can be made. The parties are free to negotiate the length of this period. Commonly this period will be for a period between 9 to 18 months.
Since the representations and warranties of a vendor are generally more onerous than the representations and warranties of the purchaser, the vendor would likely try to limit the length of the survival period as much as possible to narrow any future potential liability. The vendor may push for the representations and warranties to terminate at Closing whereas the purchaser would 164 CAPL PTP, supra note 2, clause 4.02E. 165 For example, if issue is identified by an audit, the limitation would generally be extended to be 2 years from the date the agreement permitted the audit to be conducted. However, there is a possible argument that, in some circumstances, the purchaser, using reasonable diligence, should have known it was overcharged prior to the disclosure of same in an audit, in which case the claim is not, technically, "disclosed by an audit". This would make the limitation period earlier and would require evidence demonstrating knowledge of the issue.
likely seek to preserve any claim it may have with the vendor at least until statutory limitations bar any claims.
The interplay between survival periods and the statutory limitation period applicable to ordinary claims may at times conflict. Section 7(2) of Limitations Act stipulates "an agreement that purports to provide for the reduction of a limitation period provided by this Act is not valid." 166 Since the survival period of the representations and warranties in a PSA is often less than two years, these clauses could potentially be inconsistent with the Limitations Act and be deemed invalid. For example, in the CAPL PTP, the language does not deal with "expiry" like the contract in NOV v Enerflow but has language that "each Party waives any rights it may have at law or otherwise to commence a claim or action for breach of a representation or warranty after that period." 175 The clause does not simply put "limits on the warranties provided under the Agreement" or on the triggering of contractual rights conditional upon certain events, but rather, the clause provides that a party waives its rights. This clause is arguably offside the Limitations Act and is distinguishable from the clause in NOV v Enerflow.
C. Limitation Period for Environmental Contamination
One unique statutory limitations issue that impacts energy-related PSAs is the Alberta Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act ("EPEA") 176 , which allows for the extension of the ordinary limitation periods under the Limitations Act for claims relating to environmental contamination.
These provisions acknowledge the practical realities that environmental contamination often goes undiscovered for many years, potentially making it difficult for plaintiffs to bring a claim to recover damages within statutory limitation periods. EPEA provides that the limitation period for an action claiming an "alleged adverse effect resulting from the alleged release of a substance into the environment" can be extended on application to the Court of Queen's Bench. 177 Adverse effect is expressly defined in EPEA to mean "impairment of or damage to the environment, human health or safety or property". occurred; whether the adverse effect ought to have been discovered by the claimant through the exercise of due diligence; whether the defendant will be prejudiced from maintaining a defence to the claim on the merits; and any other relevant criteria.
There is not a great deal of case law interpreting this section of EPEA. 178 In Lakeview, 179 the Court outlined the following two-step analysis for considering when a section 218 extension should be granted:
1. Is there sufficient evidence on the section 218 factors to grant an extension of the limitation period?; and 2. If there is not enough evidence to make that determination, or if there is sufficient evidence but an issue for trial could be determined prematurely, has the claimant shown a good arguable case for an extension? If so, the claimant is entitled to an extension of the limitation period subject to a final determination of the issue at trial.
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The Court noted that the test respects the purpose of section 218 "while acknowledging the legitimate interest of a claimant to know whether to spend further resources on their claim" and "allows the court to extend the limitation period for obviously meritorious section 218 cases or to weed out cases that are attempting to 'abuse the system'. contamination that occurred in the 1950s. The Court held that there was significant prejudice to the defendant in the action given the length of time since the contamination occurred, noting that witnesses, documents and experts would be difficult if not impossible to procure to defend the claim.
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In the context of the purchase and sale of a property, the practical take-away from this decision is that parties should take steps to contractually allocate liabilities for environmental contamination to avoid the possibility of potential liability unlimited by statutory time constraints. This can be done through the use of carefully drafted due diligence provisions, representations and warranties and indemnities in purchase and sale agreements. Such contractual provisions would likely be important factors considered by the courts under section 218 of EPEA.
D. Limitation of Liability Clauses
Another limitation on the recovery of losses is the possible existence of a contractual clause limiting or excluding liability. Limitation of liability or exclusion clauses generally place a cap on the amount either party can recover by reason of a breach of an agreement or in some way limit the possibility or extent of recovery for particular losses. Generally, these clauses are permissible under Canadian law and will be enforced. when a clause will be enforceable: (1) whether the exclusion clause applies to the circumstances established in the evidence; (2) whether the exclusion clause was unconscionable at the time it was entered into; and (3) whether the court should refuse to enforce a valid and applicable exclusion clause because of the existence of overriding public policy. 188 In the energy context, where parties are usually sophisticated commercial entities with independent legal advice, it will likely be difficult for a party to successfully avoid the application of a limitation of liability clause on the basis of unenforceability for reasons of unconscionability or public policy unless there is some evidence of fraud or deceit. Unconscionability will generally not exist as there is generally no imbalance in bargaining powers. 189 Further, the threshold to determine unconscionability is quite high and for example, would require behavior that was "contemptuous of its contractual obligation and reckless as to the consequences of its breach" such that a party is deemed to have forfeited the assistance of the Court. 190 Public policy exceptions are also rare. For example in Tercon, Binnie J stated "[c]onduct approaching serious criminality or egregious fraud"
would be examples of considerations of public policy. 191 As such, the primary consideration for parties is the first part of the test: whether it in fact applies to the claimed losses.
In relation to the third part of the test, courts will assess the express language of the exclusion clause and the objective intentions of the parties at the time the contract was entered into to determine whether the exclusion clause applies to the circumstances. 192 Such an analysis will be on the basis of principles of contractual interpretation which are outlined in Part I of this paper.
Limitation of liability clauses are not interpreted in isolation from the rest of the agreement at issue
and are strictly construed, with any ambiguity generally being resolved against the party seeking to rely on it. 193 The scope of the limitation of liability provision is very important. For example, does the clause only limit liability for breaches of contract or does it include liability for tort claims, such as negligence or misrepresentation? The Supreme Court of Canada has held that whether words of an exclusion clause extend to include negligence is a matter of construction and the clause need not expressly include negligence in order for it to be considered part of the exclusion.
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In Tercon, the Court highlighted a number of exclusion clauses from prior cases which it deemed to be sufficiently clear and precise enough to warrant enforcement. The Court found that interpreting and construing limitation of liability clauses. We expect further litigation on these issues in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the litigation of purchase and sale agreements can be quickly complicated as a myriad of legal principles, interpretation rules, and complicated fact patterns impact how, when, where and why parties can bring claims to recover losses. As deal flow increases, we anticipate that the issues identified in this paper relating to pre-Closing and post-Closing disputes will increasingly need to be addressed by parties and courts.
